Question 6
On January 16, you were interviewed on CNN by Larry King, and you were asked: "Are you assuring that American citizens with nothing to hide have nothing to worry about?" In response, you said:
"Well, again, as the president indicated, and I'm only talking about what the president described to the American people in his radio address, we're talking about communication where one end of the communication is outside the United States and where we have reason to believe that a party on that communication is a member of al Qaeda or is a member of an affiliate group with al Qaeda."
In your answer, you limited your assurances by making clear that you were "only talking about what the president described to the American people in his radio address."
The January 27 DoJ Press Release, in several different places, contains this same limitation on the Administration’s assurances that innocent Americans are not being eavesdropped on without warrants.
Without disclosing any operational details, are there other warrantless eavesdropping programs beyond what the President described which entail or permit warrantless eavesdropping on the communications of Americans?
Question 7
In June, 2002, Senator DeWine introduced legislation to lower the evidentiary showing required for obtaining FISA warrants targeted at non-U.S. persons from "probable cause" to "reasonable suspicion," and in response, the DoJ attorney who supervises the process for obtaining of FISA warrants, James A. Baker, submitted a Statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee, in which he indicated that the Administration was not prepared to support those changes because they were unnecessary and possibly unconstitutional.
(a) As of June, 2002, was Mr. Baker’s statement accurate that the "probable cause" standard in FISA had not created any barriers or problems which impeded the Administration from engaging in all of the anti-terrorism eavesdropping it wanted to engage in?
(b) As of the time the President ordered the NSA to eavesdrop outside of FISA, how many requests for eavesdropping warrants had the FISA court rejected in its history?
(c) In his Statement, Mr. Baker specifically thanked the Congress for creating a 72-hour window as part of the Patriot Act which allows eavesdropping during that time period without obtaining a FISA warrant. In praising that provision, Mr. Baker said that this window has "enabled the government to become quicker, more flexible, and more focused in going ‘up’ on those suspected terrorists in the United States," and "has allowed us to make full and effective use of FISA's pre-existing emergency provisions to ensure that the government acts swiftly to respond to terrorist threats."
Was Mr. Baker’s statements praising this 72-hour window as giving the Administration the speed and flexibility it needed an accurate reflection of the Administration’s view of FISA at the time?
(d) In the January 27 Press Release issued by the DoJ, the point was made several times that the 72-hour window is inadequate to enable the eavesdropping which the Administration claims it needs to engage in. Prior to the public disclosure of the NSA warrantless eavesdropping program, did the DoJ ever advise Congress that, contrary to Mr. Baker’s statement, the 72-hour warrantless window was actually insufficient and needed to be changed?
(e) If, as the DoJ now claims, the 72-hour window was insufficient and too cumbersome, why did it send Mr. Baker to specifically advise the Intelligence Committee that the 72-hour window in FISA was working well, rather than advise the Committee that this provision should be loosened or changed to fix any problems?
(f) Did the DoJ or the Administration generally ever ask Congress to amend FISA to redress what it now claims are inadequacies in the 72-hour window?
Question 8
In the Summer of 2002, not only Sen. DeWine, but also Senators Schumer and Kyl, sponsored legislation to amend FISA in order to expand the scope of the Administration’s eavesdropping powers. The statements by the Senators who spoke at the Hearings in favor of those proposed amendments, including Committee Chairman Bob Graham, leave no doubt that the Senators were operating on the assumption that FISA continued to govern and restrict the eavesdropping activities of the Bush Administration.
Senator Graham, for instance, opened the hearings by stating that the amendments were offered "for the purpose of reducing both the nature and scope of the showing the government must make to obtain a surveillance order against suspected terrorists inside the United States who are neither citizens nor legal resident aliens." Senator Schumer said that the U.S "can't do the surveillance we need to do" if it can’t meet the requirements of FISA. Senator Kyl said the amendments were necessary to "put this important tool into the hands of law enforcement and intelligence agencies here in this country so that we can add one more element to the protection of the American people."
Again and again, the Senators at this hearing said that in order to increase the Administration's eavesdropping powers, it was necessary to amend FISA -- clearly showing that they were operating with the belief that the Administration was eavesdropping only in compliance with the statute:
(a) Why didn’t the Justice Department simply tell the Senate that it was not necessary to amend FISA in order to increase the Administration’s eavesdropping powers because the Administration already had unlimited eavesdropping authority under the AUMF?
(b) According to the remarks of both Senator Schumer and Senator Kyl, the Attorney General specifically indicated his approval for these FISA amendments. Why did the Justice Department encourage the Senate to spend its time and energies expanding the scope of FISA if the Administration already believed it had all the authority it needed to engage in limitless eavesdropping under the AUMF?
(c) In his testimony before the Committee, the DoJ’s James Baker sought to assure the Committee that expanded eavesdropping would not pose any threats to civil liberties by stating the following:
So you would be, you know, connecting electronic surveillance and potentially physical search of those targets and that raises all the same kinds of civil liberties questions that FISA does to begin with. But nevertheless, you would have had--before you get to that point, you would have had a finding by a neutral and detached magistrate, and indeed in this case a sitting federal judge, district court judge, that all of the requirements of the statute are met and that there's probable cause to believe that this individual is engaged in international terrorism activities, or activities in preparation therefor.
At the time, wasn’t Mr. Baker’s statement to the Committee false because he assured them that eavesdropping could only occur when you have "a sitting federal judge, district court judge" certify "that all of the requirements of the statute are met?"
(d) Isn’t it true that these Senators – Schumer, Kyl, DeWine, Graham – who thought in 2002 that FISA needed to be amended in order to expand the Administration’s eavesdropping powers, were operating on the false assumption that the Administration was only eavesdropping in compliance with FISA?
(e) Is it accurate to say that the FISA amendments which these Senators had introduced and were publicly debating were actually entirely unnecessary in order to expand the Administration’s eavesdropping power, because the Administration had already decided that had authority to eavesdrop beyond the parameters of FISA?
Question 9
Various members of Congress, including then-Majority Leader Tom Daschle, have stated that the Administration specifically requested that Congress insert a provision into the AUMF authorizing the Administration to use war powers within the United States, but Congress refused to include such a phrase, and the AUMF does not include such an authorization.
(a) Is that an accurate rendition of events – that the Administration requested, but Congress refused, the inclusion in the AUMF of a clause authorizing the Administration to use its war powers within the U.S.?
(b) What is the legal meaning or significance of that refusal by Congress, if any? Would it have made a difference one way or the other if Congress had agreed to include that provision rather than refused to include it?
(c) Despite that refusal, is it the Administration’s position that it has the authority to exercise its war powers within the U.S.?
Question 10
In its January 27 Press Release, the DoJ argued that:
In its Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the AUMF also authorizes the "fundamental incident(s) of waging war." The history of warfare makes clear that electronic surveillance of the enemy is a fundamental incident to the use of military force.
(a) Is it the position of the Administration that, by virtue of the AUMF, the Administration is authorized to employ all of the "fundamental incidents of waging war?"
(b) Is it the position of the Administration that it is authorized to employ all of the "fundamental incidents of waging war" not only abroad, but also here within the United States?
(c) It is the position of the Administration that it is authorized to employ all of the "fundamental incidents of waging war" not only against foreign nationals, but against U.S. citizens as well?
(d) Is it the position of the Administration that the President would have these powers – namely to employ all of the "fundamental incidents of waging war" both abroad and here in the United States – even if the AUMF did not give that authority to the President?
(e) Is it the position of the Administration that the "fundamental incidents of waging war" include: (i) eavesdropping; (ii) detention of individuals it believes are enemy combatants; (iii) interrogation; and (iv) indefinite incarceration, even without counsel, charges being brought, or a trial?
(f) Is the following a fair summary of the Administration’s view of the President’s power:
In responding to threats of terrorism, the President has the power: (i) to eavesdrop on American citizens both outside of and within the U.S., (ii) to detain them, (iii) to use any methods he wants to interrogate them, and (iv) to incarcerate them indefinitely without counsel or a trial -- and the President can do all of this, including to U.S. citizens and inside the U.S., without any ability on the part of Congress or the courts to interfere with or limit those activities in any way?
(g) Is it the Administration’s position that the President has the power to order any of those activities described in the previous question even if Congress passes a law making it a crime to engage in or order those activities against American citizens?
(h) Leave aside the question of what the Administration intends to do or not do -- Is it the Administration’s position that it has the power, legally, to eavesdrop on a U.S. citizen inside the U.S. with no warrant, detain that citizen with no trial or charges being brought, interrogate that citizen using even those methods outlawed by the McCain Amendment, and incarcerate that citizen indefinitely – and that it can do all of those things even if Congress enacts laws prohibiting those activities?
These questions are looking really good, Glenn.
ReplyDeleteOne initial comment:
I think #9 doesn't quite go far enough. It's not just that Congress would have been enacting unnecessary legislation, it's that it would have been enacting legislation the administration considered unconstitutional. None of these amendments even considered doing away with the exclusivity provision of FISA, which is the provision the DoJ suggests is unconstitutional if given its most logical reading.
Perhaps you could add something similar to the following:
(f) In your white paper you write that "if FISA could not be read to allow the President to authorize the NSA activities during the current congressionally authorized armed conflict with al Qaeda, FISA would be unconstitutional..."
Was Congress at any time advised that the administration held this belief? Did the administration at any point warn Congress that, in its opinion, it was attempting to legislate in an area of exclusive presidential authority? Was Congress ever advised that to the extent FISA was intended to provide the exclusive means of conducting this type of surveillance, that the statute was unconstitutional?
On 8.d., Gonzales will simply state that you will have to ask those Senators what their feelings were at that time. This one's too easy for him to duck.
ReplyDeleteThe US connections are presumed alQaeda sympathizers, fellow travelers etc..., they may be armed legally. The terrorist acts in Beslan were accomplished with rifles and hand guns, plus some explosives. If the President has the power, is it not reckless to NOT go to every phone location eavesdropped on and confiscate all their weapons. Is it better to continue to listen or put our children at risk daily from armed al Qaeda sympathizers. I fear that the politics of this matter has the President making value judgments that the 2nd amendment supporters are more politically valuable than the 4th amendment supporters. He will take al Qaeda's privacy, but not their weapons. He is spinning out of control.
ReplyDeleteIn view of possible a-la-Watergate spying, there ought to be questions that force a choice by the administration to either admit to tapping non-Al-Qaeda phones/emails, or commit perjury in a cover-up effort, e.g.:
ReplyDelete11a. Is a full & complete record of all monitored phone numbers and email addresses kept? Has it been kept since inception of this program? If not, since what date?
11 b. Is any such list or record, in its entirety, available for inspection by judicial or congressional personnel suitably cleared to view and receive classified information?
11 c. Have phone numbers or emails of members of Congress or congressional staff, or of newspaper reporters, or of employees or agents of the US govt. in agencies such as (for example) CIA, NSA, DOJ, State Dept., etc.,been monitored by this administration as part of this or any other administration surveillance activities?
An 11th Question
ReplyDeleteWhy not ask if the administration will allow a suitably non-partisan, trusted-by-all-sides, panel of greybeards review the activities of the NSA in this bypass of the FISA? Let this panel take a look at exactly who has been spied on using this bypass, and then report to the nation whether there is any hint that this was used to gather dirt on political enemies, or whether the subjexts of these warrantless wiretaps were indeed all reasonably suspect of activities that actually posed some potential threat to national, as oppposed to Bush, security.
Your ref Yoo, War Powers, signing statement good.
ReplyDeleteBut I see little that really takes the lead for debate arising.
May I suggest that we(the people) will be taken very seriously with a constructive line of argument around technology as 'any means' whereby the President would claim to prosecute protection.
And why? Because the facts of digital networking have correctly been cited as not meeting the language of FISA.
Thus propose the following questions(which contain self-evident explanation, but if not I would suggest a reading of Wm Arkin's latest Early Warning blog and commentary at Wapo).
1. How do you(DOJ) relate the digital data PACKET to the PERSON as in "U.S. person" or "non-U.S. person"?
Aid: 'packet' is the single most pertinent component of all digital communications technology.
2. If you(DOJ) do not so relate, how would the Administration propose to in order to operate under the rule of law?
Keep up the good work.. regards
These are great.
ReplyDeleteWhat about asking directly if Gonzales thinks the Administration can legally order the US military to kill US citizens, inside the US, who they determine to be enemy combatants at their sole discretion-- without filing any criminal charges, in spite of any laws passed by Congress to the contrary, or any right for the courts to interfere?
Just dropped Schumer a note, he's my Senator, and suggested that the Democrats' questioning of Alito was a little embarrassing--incomplete, ad-hoc, not terribly well grounded--and suggested the hearings next week might be an opportunity for the Dems to do better. Also, I appended your list of 10 questions...we'll see if they get any traction with him. Thanks for the list and the expertise that went into it.
ReplyDeleteGet back to the practical questions
ReplyDeleteThe proposed questions seem designed to provoke a thorough and searching review of the constitutional, procedural issues raised by FISA abd the whole process by which we have implemented this law since its passage in 1978. While this is a worthy discussion, and I myself have a strong proceduralist bias in my own line of work (medicine, not the law), it strikes me as exactly the wrong discussion to emphasize in investigating the matter at hand, this bypass by this administration of the FISA process.
As a practical matter, it seems to me that under the existing FISA process, the FISA judges applied a very different operational standard of "probable cause" than ordinary judges in ordinary domestic criminal cases. I assume this from the sheer numbers of FISA warrants that have been cited as having been approved, in this administration and prior, along with the incredibly low rate of refusal of requests. Certainly my impression could be wrong, and please, anyone out there who has even ballpark figures on the number of wiretap warrants granted annualy in ordinary Federal criminal matters, please help out this practical discussion, but I have trouble believing that the FBI could possibly be making over 10,000 presentations of facts to FISA judges a year, that are anywhere near as solidly based as the probable cause standard ordinary judges hold them to in ordinary criminal cases. There just can't be that much espionage and terrorist activity out there to generate so many probable cause presentations, unless FISA judges accept fairly tenuous facts as probable cause.
So yes, as a proceduralist, I think the ten questions are important, because I think that it is important to bring practice and the Law into alignment with one another. If the FISA practice is sound, by all means let us make whatever changes in the law, and even the Constitution, necessary to make that sound practice legal. And if, on the other hand, after looking into the practical results of the FISA judges having expanded the boundaries of probable cause, we find that it is still a sound standard, then by all means let us get the FISA judges back into alignment with existing law.
But this wider issue isn't the point right now. The practical problem we have right now is that we have an administration that has decided to spy on folks who presumably don't meet even the loose probable cause that FISA has been living by. Did they break the glass on even these attenuated constitutional safeguards in an arguably over-zealous pursuit of probable terrorists, or did the administration have to bypass even the "indict-a-ham-sandwich" FISA judges because even they would not roll over for spying on the domestic political opposition?
Raising the wider issues now is problematic, not because they are an irrelevant complexity that makes the truly worrisome narrative hard for the average voter to follow, but because the wider issue tends to make credible the false administration claim that they had to choose between folloowint the rules and protecting the national security. I don't patronize my patients, and I have no problem explaining even the most technical medical issue to them, even if some of the details cast doubt on the wisdom of the course of treatment I am going to recommend, because I have found that the threat to their health involved makes them willing to pay careful and thoughtful attention to even complicated technical matters. The discussion doesn't need to be dumbed-down for the voters, but please, let's emphasize the practical matter at hand, a loose cannon administration, and not raise issues in this context that might actually confer an undeserved legitimacy to what they have done. We may actually need a looser official standard than probable cause to deal with espionage and foreign terrorism, but don't raise the general issue now, when that helps them pretend that their specific bypass of FISA was necessary to get out from under an over-restrictive probable cause standard, since the FISA process didn't actually enforce probable cause anyway.
The line of questioning designed to keep the discussion focesed on the matter at hand, the loose cannon admionistration, has been suggested by prior posters. The real crux is accountability, that the bypass has allowed the administration to spy without any outside oversight enforcing any standards. So, ask about records they have kept on who they've been spying on under this bypass. Then ask what possible objection they could have to the committee, going into secret session if need be to protect sources and methods, reviewing these records to establish at least after-the-fact oversight. These are the key, touchstone, questions that will reveal the extent of the danger from this law-breakng by the adnministration. If they truly broke the glass in a good faith effort to protect this country in an emergency, they will have nothing to fear from outside review, by a sympathetic, Republican-controlled Congress, of their actions. Refusal to cooperate means that they have been spying on folks whom even their apologists could not stomach being spied upon.
I would add this question: Mr. Bush, does anyone who does not work for you know who has been or is being spied on?
ReplyDelete