This morning, a federal judge in Michigan is hearing a potentially significant Oral Argument on the legality and constitutionality of the administration's warrantless eavesdropping program. The lawsuit was brought by the ACLU on behalf of Arab-Americans in the Detroit area and others who claim that the mere existence of the program violates their free speech and privacy rights by making them reluctant to speak freely, due to fear of having their private conversations illegally intercepted by the Bush administration. The hearing this morning is to argue the plaintiffs' motion for an order compelling the administration to immediately cease its warrantless eavesdropping.
The lawsuit cannot maintain a direct attack on the legality of warrantless eavesdropping because it is very difficult to find a plaintiff who has "standing" to challenge the program, because nobody knows who has been the target of the eavesdropping and, therefore, no individual can prove that they were injured by the program. The theory of the lawsuit -- that its mere existence deters citizens from freely exercising their free speech rights -- is a mildly creative tactic for overcoming this legal hurdle. The lawsuit is an attempt to enable the federal judiciary to adjudicate the legality of the NSA program even in the absence of a plaintiff who was demonstrably subject to warrantless eavesdropping.
Although I am not, for a variety of reason, particularly optimistic about the likelihood that this suit will yield meaningful results, there are two significant developments to note. The first is that the District Court Judge presiding over the suit agreed to hear the ACLU's motion on the substance of the claim even though the Bush administration -- as it always does in these cases -- frivolously invoked the "state secrets" doctrine in demanding that the lawsuit be dismissed. Typically, once the Government invokes that doctrine, everything else is put on hold and, almost always, the court then dismisses the lawsuit, on the ground that the Executive branch knows better than the judiciary what will jeopardize state secrets.
Here, though, the Judge ruled that she would first hear the plaintiffs' Motion to enjoin the warrantless eavesdropping program (which was filed before the administration's Motion to Dismiss based on the "state secrets" doctrine), and only then hear the administration's motion to dismiss. Thus, for the first time ever, a federal court this morning is entertaining substantive arguments as to the legality of warrantless eavesdropping.
It is possible that the court's decision to hear this motion was a purely procedural ruling -- i.e., that because the plaintiffs' motion was filed first (before the administration's motion to dismiss), it ought to be heard first. But it seems far more likely that there is a substantive aspect to the court's refusal to simply freeze everything and listen to nothing other than the "state secrets" claim. Even once the court ruled that it would hear the plaintiffs' motion first, the administration continued to argue vigorously that the court is required to hear its "state secrets" motion first:
Justice Department lawyers filed a new motion June 2 asking the judge to clarify her order and to once again consider their arguments on standing and "state secrets" before considering any other issue. Taylor is expected to respond at today's hearing.
If the plaintiffs overcome the government's argument, it will be highly unusual. Justice Department attorneys almost always prevail when they invoke the "state secrets" privilege, even when judges acknowledge a plaintiff raises serious issues.
The judge's refusal to adhere to that request seems to signal that the judge does not view the mere recitation of the words "state secrets" as a signal that her power to rule has been magically stripped away without any analysis as to the validity of that claim. It may be a small rumbling indicating that the judiciary -- like a handful of members of Congress -- are beginning to find the courage to assert their institutional role in our government.
Here, the very invocation of the "state secrets" doctrine by the administration is simply ludicrous. The President already acknowledged the existence and substance of the program, and the lawsuit's theory is that this knowledge, by itself, chills plaintiffs' free speech and privacy rights. No further disclosures are needed to adjudicate the legality of the government's conduct. But no matter. Judges almost always defer to the "state secrets" claim. But perhaps some courts will start to recognize that the doctrine here -- like so much else in our political life - is being radically exploited by an administration which virtually never cares about national security but acts to protect only its political interests:
The privilege has been used most often by officials in the executive branch of government, said William G. Weaver, an attorney and a political science professor at the University of Texas, El Paso, who has co-written a scholarly article on the subject."It is the most powerful privilege available to the president," Weaver said. "If it is properly invoked, it wins every single time."
Before the Sept. 11 attacks, Weaver said, government lawyers generally used the privilege at the instigation of mid-level officials who did not want a program's operational details revealed.
In recent years, though, it has become "a top-down enterprise," he said. "The privilege has been transformed into a political device to protect the president from embarrassment."
To the extent that this lawsuit chips away even minimally at the prior invulnerability of this manipulative tactic, it will have contributed substantial value.
The second notable aspect of this development is the mere existence of the argument itself. The principal focus of the NSA scandal has been on political and Congressional developments -- the machinations in the Senate, the prospect for investigations and new legislative cover-ups, etc. But when we have a president who is systematically and deliberately breaking the law, the judiciary has a substantial role to play in checking that illegal behavior.
Although the judiciary has been at least as deferential over the last five years as the meek and compliant Congress has been, judicial challenges to the administration's lawlessness provide, at least in theory, a separate mechanism for holding the administration accountable for its lawbreaking. The fact that the administration is forced to defend the legality of its behavior in a federal court this morning is a helpful and necessary reminder that we are supposed to have other branches of government imposing checks and limitations on the lawlessness of the president.
UPDATE: The dates and events for my book tour are now posted on the Working Assets site, which updates the schedule regularly as more events are confirmed. I'm currently in Washington and will be at a book signing tomorrow, from 10:45-11:00 a.m., at the Washington Hilton Hotel, followed by a panel discussion of the blogosphere from 11:00 a.m.-12:15 p.m. as part of the Take Back America Conference.
After DC, I will be in New York and will post the events then. Just a couple of notes: (1) This Saturday, June 17, at 8:00 p.m., I am doing a book talk/book reading at the Upper West Side YMCA (5 W. 63rd Street) as part of the Writer's Voice Series. That should be a great event, and I hope readers of this blog in NYC will attend; (2) I will be on the Al Franken Show on Monday, June 19, from 1:30-2:00 p.m.
Probably just their way of expressing that they expect their bribe to continue to maintain the criminality.
ReplyDeleteOr perhaps it is just part of a charade, a'la arlen sphincter, to create the illusion that there is oversite.
Of course, maybe something meaningful will come out of this -- appreciate you comments and posting, glenn.
If this is the case I'm thinking of, the DOJ failed to file an opposition to the summary judgment motion. Will be interesting to see how the court proceeds. Georgia10 at DKos has written about this matter within the last two weeks. The filings are available through the PACER system at the court's website. The court is the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. The case no. is 06CV-10204.
ReplyDeleteAs I see it, there have been two prongs to the recent expansion of executive power: surveillance policy and detention policy.[*] I find both topics extremely important, but I'm usually more worried about arbitrary detention and torture than I am about eavesdropping.
ReplyDeleteJune is Torture Awareness Month, and I've joined their blogging faction. The single best resource I've found is Balkinization's Anti-Torture Memos, which contain everything that several law profs have written on executive power in the last few years. If anyone is interested, here is a link to everything I've blogged on the subject.
I hope some of you will take the time to read about all of the abuse and what we can do about it. If you are moved to do so, I hope some of you will contact the heroes opposing Bush's onslaught and thank them for everything they're doing. If you have a blog, consider directing your readers to torture-related posts and articles this month. We need to change public opinion on this, and maybe once people see the way people are arbitrarily detained and abused, they will begin to fear the national surveillance state as much as they should.
[*]One could add more prongs, if you count the degree of control that a few big businesses have over policy, the Iraq war, etc. But they usually don't involve the same claims of executive privilege, state secrets, etc.
Anonymous, thanks for the information. Based just on demographics, Southeastern Michigan is one of the better places to file this kind of suit. It's the most (the only) liberal part of the state, and it has the largest population of Muslims in the U.S.
ReplyDeletePeople from that region should be willing to get involved if we get the word out.
Here's (.pdf) a May 2006 amicus brief from the lawsuilt involving the ACLU, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Greenpeace, Larry Diamond, et al. I think it's the same case, but I'm not 100% sure.
ReplyDeleteThe court is in Detroit. Here is its address:
231 West Lafayette Blvd.,
Second Floor
Detroit, MI 48226
This Google Search should contain all of the official documents from the case (along with some other stuff).
I hope I'm not muddying the waters by referring people to the wrong case and I hope people will correct me if I'm mistaken.
Glenn, hi
ReplyDeleteJerry Hill here, met you that first day of your tour, in Gainesville at the Civil Media Center--tall guy, beard. Kudos for continuing good work in your tour [ykos], hope for even higher profile interviews; working towards that critical mass. Amazing what one guy can do...pzykr has diaries [not much] on TPM Cafe, kos, and MyDD. Here's my favorite: i think the administration knew 9/11 was going to happen and a, allowed it to happen and b, prepared for it including by writing the USA PATRIOT Act:
http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/11/13/4383/9905
Glenn,
ReplyDeleteFYI, The Upper West Side YMCA is, as it named implies, at 5 [W]est 63rd Street...not 5 E. 63rd.
See ya there!
Maybe some judge will have the balls to hold the administration's feet to the fire on the frivolous use of the state secrets privilege. This whole question brings up a number of thorny questions.
ReplyDeleteFirst, is not the judiciary part of the tripartate state in the US? Do they therefore not have the right to compel the administration to reveal the secret to them in order to adjudicate the invocation of the privilege? If this is not the case, then the administration is in effect declaring themselves to be the only branch of government that is part of the state. Huhh??? What does the law have to say on this matter?
My understanding of presidential authority is that it comes in three flavours; constitutional, statutory, and traditional. Under which of these categories does this state secrets business fall? My feeling on the traditional category is that it is basically a bluff strategy; if some past president has gotten away with something in the past, this somehow creates a 'traditional' presidential privilege. Glenn has pointed out in past blogs how dubya has sidestepped judicial review of his actions (specifically in the Padilla case) in order to perpetuate the perception of his having legal authority where none exists. How many past presidents have done the same thing? What constitutional mechanism exists to challenge the abuse of this tactic?
Daniel:
ReplyDeleteNot many judges named "Anna" have "balls," I'm afraid. If the analysis at the beginning of your comment is correct, the Michigan case has no hope.
/snark
Ohmygod, I've been disenchastised!
ReplyDeleteMETAPHOR: 1 : a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them (as in drowning in money); broadly : figurative language -- compare SIMILE
Thanks, Glenn. While I'm not sure how far this case will go, the judge's willingness to hear it gives me hope.
ReplyDeleteP.S. Your book is next on the pile... I'm looking forward to it!
Even if a federal court, or the supreme court, were to rule the NSA program illegal and the administration in violation of valid constitutional law, what provision is there for enforcement? It is the executive branch which is tasked with enforcing the law and the courts' rulings and the highest state's attorney serves at the pleasure of the president.
ReplyDeleteCorrect me if I am wrong, but I believe there are only 3 actual checks on the power of a president who violates his oath of office and operates outside of the law and the constitution:
1. Mandatory elections
2. Impeachment
3. Term limits
The Republican party and the press defeated #1 easily. Court rulings, revelations of lawbreaking by the press and the will of the public only matter if congress is willing to back them up with the real threat of impeachment. Censure is nothing but a warning that impeachment is likely if the president continues to defy congress. If congress refuses to act, whether out of complicity or cowardice, then we are simply left waiting for 8 years to be over and hoping martial law isn't imposed before then.
This administration can, will, and generally has already used every dirty trick in the book, sometimes at the drop of a hat. Witness Cheney's mandamus temper tantrum. Sadly, those secret energy task force documents and minutes never were fully revealed, so we may never know what they were doing with that map of Iraq's oil fields...
ReplyDeleteMajor, I know they don't teach you to think at officer school, but do they teach you to spell?
ReplyDeleteOK, now I know the Major's just jerking your chains. Nobody's that black-hole dumb.
ReplyDelete"The Major" is obviously some liberal's idea of a conservative. Unfortunately, some knee-jerkers here really believe that this type of person exists - and would care to comment on this lefty blog. The jingos and bad spelling are part of the spoof. Sharpen up.
ReplyDeleteGlenn:
ReplyDeleteThe theory of the lawsuit -- that its [the wiretapping program] mere existence deters citizens from freely exercising their free speech rights -- is a mildly creative tactic for overcoming this legal hurdle.
It's hardly unprecedented. It's been used in "free speech" cases and other similar situations where people have claimed that they would like to do something but are inhibited from doing so by the existence of the law or policy (this is the "harm" alleged). Dunno what the run-down is on denying standing for lack of "ripeness" or "injury in fact", but AFAIK, more than a couple have been allowed to proceed on such a basis. If someone has access to Lexis, maybe they can look up either the briefs (which should cover this standing issue), or dig up some cases on this. I think the courts would look askanse at a purely hypothetical desire to do something, versus those that can demonstrate that they actually are in a position to, and likely, do something but for their fear of the law.
You don't have to commit a "crime" in order to challenge a law (or otherwise put yourself "at risk"); all you have to do is show that you have a reasonable fear concerning the law that inhibits you from doing what should be your right to do normally (and that you would do). Don't think that just making calls (or international calls) is something that is sufficiently uncommon that the gummint could say the plaintiffs aren't in a position to do so but for the gummint policy of snooping on them....
Cheers,
I don't know. I've been over to The Major's blog. He's been consistently stupid since April. Maybe he just has really fat fingers.
ReplyDeleteGlenn:
ReplyDeleteHere, the very invocation of the "state secrets" doctrine by the administration is simply ludicrous. The President already acknowledged the existence and substance of the program, and the lawsuit's theory is that this knowledge, by itself, chills plaintiffs' free speech and privacy rights. No further disclosures are needed to adjudicate the legality of the government's conduct.
The argument of the gummint, similar to the el-Masri case, will be that any official acknowledgement of the program, regardless of what is known in public about the case, is giving away "state secrets", namely that the gummint has, or alternatively doesn't have, such a program. Even if everything is known about it, adding the official imprimatur of official acknowledgement adds some minuscule amount of "certainty" to the issue, and that helps the Terra-ists. See the motions in the el-Masri case.
Of course this is a crock'o'sh*te, but that's what they'll argue.
Cheers,
Glen, The judge "deffered" the decision. What does that bode? -thanks
ReplyDelete"DETROIT (Reuters) - A federal judge on Monday deferred making an immediate decision on a request that the Bush administration's domestic eavesdropping program be halted as a violation of law."
http://today.reuters.com/News/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-06-12T191219Z_01_N11178720_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY-EAVESDROPPING.xml
As for "harm to plaintiffs", here's the ACLU motion for SJ and memorandum in support of the motion.
ReplyDeleteThe plaintiffs reply to the gummint's standing arguments in their Reply Memorandum in support of the SJ motion.
Cheers,
From the CCR (N.Y.) case: an article by one of the attorneys. A real attorney (you know, unlike "criminal prosecutor" Harold "Bart" DePalma ... who should be making his customary appearance spreading the horse manure as fast as he can produce it in ... *three* *two* *one*...).
ReplyDeleteCheers,
Even if everything is known about it, adding the official imprimatur of official acknowledgement adds some minuscule amount of "certainty" to the issue, and that helps the Terra-ists.
ReplyDeleteBut the government has officially acknowledged its existence multiple times - beginning with the President publicly, followed by numerous DoJ documents.
The judge "deffered" the decision. What does that bode? -thanks
That just means that the judge didn't decide the motion immediately after oral argument was done, but instead will decide at some future point (likely in a written decision and order). That is extremely common - judges listen to oral arguments but then issue a decision some time later.
Glenn: A post at Dkos indicates the court put over ruling to at least July 10--after the state secrets motion has been heard. This indicates to me that she will review and rule on that issue.
ReplyDeleteGlenn:
ReplyDelete[Arne]: Even if everything is known about it, adding the official imprimatur of official acknowledgement adds some minuscule amount of "certainty" to the issue, and that helps the Terra-ists.
But the government has officially acknowledged its existence multiple times - beginning with the President publicly, followed by numerous DoJ documents.
I know, and you know. That said, what I was saying is what the gummint's position was/will be. Se, e.g., the gummint brief in the el-Masri case, and Porter Goss's affidavit in support....
Cheers,
I know, and you know. That said, what I was saying is what the gummint's position was/will be.
ReplyDeleteActually, according to the NYT article, the argument is slightly different - they conceded that the Government has officially acknowledged the existence of the program, but claim that it's the details which show that the program is legal, and those can't be disclosed without doing "grave damage to American national security."
A post at Dkos indicates the court put over ruling to at least July 10--after the state secrets motion has been heard. This indicates to me that she will review and rule on that issue.
Good point. That is probably what she will do.
Hey Everybody,
ReplyDeleteAnn Coulter's new book is #1 at Amazon and we all know how great it was when Glen's book hit #1 at Amazon.
Says the "Dog"
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteActually, according to the NYT article, the argument is slightly different - they conceded that the Government has officially acknowledged the existence of the program, but claim that it's the details which show that the program is legal, and those can't be disclosed without doing "grave damage to American national security."
You have a point, Glenn. From the N.Y. Times article:
"'You have conceded, have you not, that a program has been authorized?' she asked Mr. Coppolino. He responded that the administration's public defense of the program has been too general to serve as the basis for judicial adjudication. 'There is very much a difference,' Mr. Coppolino said, 'between the existence of an activity and the details of that activity.'"
Slight shift of the goalposts. They 'admit' that they're doing something legal (and there is a small loophole here where the ACLU can say they would like a judicial decision as to any surveillance in contravention of FISA as a matter of law, which is pretty much what they're doing). What the gummint will 'not confirm or deny' is what surveillance they're actually doing. So the goal posts have been moved; kind of like if the gummint said it had the power to hold and interrogate suspected criminals (an unremarkable proposition) but they don't want to reveal the specific parameters of any particular "arrests" and/or "interrogations" because that would reveal what it was they were willing or not willing to do (as they contended in the el-Masri case). It's pretty much the same argument, with a newer prettier wrapping.
I really don't understand what it is about the specific parameters of the program that would make it any more acceptable WRT the claim it violates FISA (FISA has no such "exceptions"). The gummint argument seems directed towards the claim of actual harm. But the ACLU has covered this in their briefs; they assert that the harm occurs whether they are surveilled or not. And the gummint's position -- "Trust us, we're not listening to you, so you really aren't being harmed (but we won't tell you that)" -- puts it right back to the place it was in the el-Masri case.
Cheers,
Daniel W. Gerous said...
ReplyDeleteThis whole question brings up a number of thorny questions.
First, is not the judiciary part of the tripartate state in the US? Do they therefore not have the right to compel the administration to reveal the secret to them in order to adjudicate the invocation of the privilege?
Justice filed a secret brief describing at least part of the NSA Program and made it available to the Judge (bit not the plaintiffs) to view in a secure site in Washington. Apparently they are going to extend a security clearance to this judge for this limited purpose.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006061200158_pf.html
However, I do not see how the judge can enter summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when there are no stipulated set of facts unless the plaintiffs are going to stipulate to the facts in the secret brief.
If the defense does not stipulate to the facts as alleged in the government's brief, then the judge has to rule on the Secrets Privilege first.
If she rules in favor of the plaintiffs, there will be an appeal all the way to the Supremes before the Government gives the ACLU top secret materials.
If she rules in favor of the government like the other federal judge, then she has to dismiss the case because discovery cannot be permitted.
It is possible that she could dismiss the case outright for lack of a claim. The plaintiffs are claiming the mere existence of a program spying on al Qaeda somehow chills their freedom of speech by making foreigners reluctant to call them. Creative, but a legal crock.
The Major said...
ReplyDelete"That judge needs to be impeched or worse. She's indangering all our safetys just so she can score points agaitnst President George W. Bush.
He's just trying to keep us safe and alive. And pat Rioberts said you dont have any civil rights when your dead. I don't want to know any stuff that will get me killed. AndI'd rather have my life then my civil rights."
You should move to China. You will be real safe there and not have any rights, which seems to fit your criteria for having a good life. Just leave the dangerous life of having freedom to us here in the U.S. that want it rather than trying to subject the rest of us to what you feel comfortable with.
Good luck to you, I expect to see you posting in Mandarin the next time you post here. Oh yeah that's right, you won't be able to post here under Chinese censorship laws. Oh well, good luck to you anyway.
HWSNBN is clueless about law again:
ReplyDeleteHowever, I do not see how the judge can enter summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when there are no stipulated set of facts unless the plaintiffs are going to stipulate to the facts in the secret brief.
There's no requirement for a "stipulated set of facts" for granting (or ruling on) a SJ motion:
From FRCP Rule 56(B):
"... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Note that both sides don't need to agree to every fact; only to material ones. In fact, for purposes of evaluating a summary judgement, any issue of fact are assumed to be resolved in favour of the non-moving party, and if, assuming the facts in the light most favourable to the non-moving party, that party still can't win as a matter of law, then summary judgement is appropriate. This is just a different way of saying the same thing: if the facts are as claimed by the non-moving party, yet these facts wouldn't support a judgement for the non-moving party as a matter of law, then they are not "material" (i.e., not capable of affecting the outcome).
Cheers,
Slight clarification on a post above:
ReplyDelete[Arne]: Slight shift of the goalposts. They 'admit' that they're doing something legal...
"[L]egal" there probably should have been in quotes. They admit to a program, but they claim it to be legal (on the cockamamie "AUMF" and "Article II" claims). Just AAMOF, whether something's legal is a matter of law and not of fact. And as such, the program can be determined to be legal or illegal based on the stipulations, the admissions (as the plaintiffs show in their response brief, plenty of evidence that the gummint is doing warrantless surveillances, and the gummint makes not pretense at denying such in their arguments), and the law. At this point, it's just a matter of law as to whether the preznit has the power to ignore the plain requirements of FISA (or whether, as such as HWSNBN would argue, FISA either doesn't apply because of amendment by the AUMF or because it's unconstitutional).
Cheers,
HWSNBN is full'o'sh*te:
ReplyDeleteIt is possible that she could dismiss the case outright for lack of a claim. The plaintiffs are claiming the mere existence of a program spying on al Qaeda somehow chills their freedom of speech by making foreigners reluctant to call them. Creative, but a legal crock.
They made very specific arguments as to the "harm in fact". HWSNBN didn't bother to read their briefs (I gave him links), so he's clueless as to what they did claim. Because of his studied ignorance, he blissfully and ignorantly spouts the above horse patooties.....
Needless to say, there are far better lawyers involved here than "criminal prosecutor" Harold "Bart" DePalma, so what he says here doesn't amount to more than a large rhinoceros fart.
Cheers,
I am doing a book talk/book reading at the Upper West Side YMCA (5 W. 63rd Street) as part of the Writer's Voice Series. That should be a great event, and I hope readers of this blog in NYC will attend;
ReplyDelete-- can't find a place to see if you need to buy tickets for this. No site or link...
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteHere, the very invocation of the "state secrets" doctrine by the administration is simply ludicrous. The President already acknowledged the existence and substance of the program, and the lawsuit's theory is that this knowledge, by itself, chills plaintiffs' free speech and privacy rights. No further disclosures are needed to adjudicate the legality of the government's conduct.
Glenn, you should know better than that as an attorney.
Where is the evidence?
The only detailed alleged descriptions of the program are inadmissible double hearsay press reports from anonymous sources. Almost every senator and rep briefed on the program claims that the press reports describing are wrong to a large extent.
Assuming what the AG stated out of court is admissible as a hearsay exception admission of a party opponent, what do the AG's vague statements prove except that the government is wiretapping al Qaeda? Specifically, the government has not admitted (or denied) the evidence necessary to prove the plaintiffs' standing - that the government is wiretapping their telephone conversations.
Indeed, the NYT noted that the Judge kept coming back to the standing issue and asked the ACLU attorney to argue it further.
As Ms. Beeson concluded her argument, which had been uninterrupted by questions, Judge Taylor called her back to the lectern. "Talk about standing some more," Judge Taylor said, perhaps identifying the part of the plaintiffs' case she considered the most difficult.
This claim is such a reach on so many levels that this judge will be reversed pretty handily by the court of appeals if this Carter appointee plays politics and goes along with the ACLU's magical mystery tour.
Arne Langsetmo said...
ReplyDeleteBart: However, I do not see how the judge can enter summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when there are no stipulated set of facts unless the plaintiffs are going to stipulate to the facts in the secret brief.
There's no requirement for a "stipulated set of facts" for granting (or ruling on) a SJ motion:
From FRCP Rule 56(B):
"... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Note that both sides don't need to agree to every fact; only to material ones.
That is correct. There must be a stipulated set of facts.
In fact, for purposes of evaluating a summary judgement, any issue of fact are assumed to be resolved in favour of the non-moving party, and if, assuming the facts in the light most favourable to the non-moving party, that party still can't win as a matter of law, then summary judgement is appropriate. This is just a different way of saying the same thing: if the facts are as claimed by the non-moving party...
As usual, you have it only partially right.
The facts are what the evidence says they are. Here is a simple example. If the plaintiff says a he was born on April 15, 1960 and provides a birth certificate via affidavit, it doesn't matter if the defendant claims that plaintiff was born in 1962 if defendant cannot provide any contrary evidence.
In this case, ACLU's etch-a-sketch version of the facts of the case are based entirely on alleged admission of the AG and General Heyden. The Government has not agreed to any of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs and has submitted its own classified version of the facts to the judge stating that the surveillance is limited to al Qaeda and is not targeting the plaintiffs.
If the plaintiffs agree to this set of government facts, they will lose summary judgment and the case will be dismissed for lack of standing because they have conceded that the NSA is not surveilling their telephone calls.
Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs did not concede the government's facts in their reply brief, therefore there are no stipulated facts in the case upon which to rule on summary judgment.
HWSNBN continues his prevarications:
ReplyDelete[Glenn]: ... the lawsuit's theory is that this knowledge, by itself, chills plaintiffs' free speech and privacy rights. No further disclosures are needed to adjudicate the legality of the government's conduct.
Glenn, you should know better than that as an attorney.
Where is the evidence?
Don't need evidence (at least for the SJ motion) unless the gummint chooses to contest material allegations made by the plaintiffs. Simple denial of an allegation is not sufficient to put a fact into dispute:
FRCP Rule 56(E) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party."
IOW, you at least have to make the claim that there's specific facts you can point to to keep you in court.
I'd note that the gummint could (and apparently did) make essentially a SJ motion claiming that the plaintiffs couldn't know that they were being wiretapped (and the gummint refuses to tell them), and that therefore they were not 'injured' (or at least can't prove such) and as such must lose as a matter of law. But that wasn't the claim of the plaintiffs.
Cheers,
In other news, HWSNBN is today still a wilfully ignorant berk:
ReplyDeleteSpecifically, the government has not admitted (or denied) the evidence necessary to prove the plaintiffs' standing - that the government is wiretapping their telephone conversations.
The plaintiffs claim that they are harmed whether or not they have themselves individually been wiretapped.
HWSNBN would know this if he'd read the freakin' briefs.
Cheers,
HWSNBN, clueless as ever:
ReplyDeleteFrom FRCP Rule 56(B):
"... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
[Arne]: Note that both sides don't need to agree to every fact; only to material ones.
That is correct. There must be a stipulated set of facts.
Yes, I was correct. No, your additional claim is false. There doesn't need to be "a stipulated set of facts". All there needs to be is no material issues of fact in dispute. And that is if a SJ judgement is to be granted.
NWSNBN blathers pointlessly:
As usual, you have it only partially right.
The facts are what the evidence says they are. Here is a simple example. If the plaintiff says a he was born on April 15, 1960 and provides a birth certificate via affidavit, it doesn't matter if the defendant claims that plaintiff was born in 1962 if defendant cannot provide any contrary evidence.
As I indicated above in citing Rule 56(E), a simple denial of an allegation is insufficient to counter such a proffered fact. However: The defendant may assert by affidavit that the plaintiff was instead born in 1964 (although they need to be prepared to testify or to present testimony in court as to such). That is sufficient to put this fact at issue (so that if it's material, there is something for a jury to try).
I'd note that this shows a curious quirk of the legal system; a hangover from days of yore. The bedrock of "evidence" is personal testimony, even in this day and age of forensic sciences. Way back when, courts were essentially one person's word against another, and this was all "evidence" (and in fact, pretty much the only evidence there was). Depending on who the jury believed, there was your case. Nowadays, with physical evidence coming more and more into the courtroom, we can get away from the "he said, she said" stuff and get to more rationally and objectively determinable "facts". But strangely enough, such "facts" may still not "speak for themselves", but rather, because of the forms and customs of the courts, must be "introduced" by people who testify as to the authenticity and the meaning of the physical evidence. As the OJ trial (which, FWIW, I predicted the verdicts on) showed, you can defeat (what should have been damning) physical evidence by attacking the chain of custody and the integrity and competence of those responsible for it. Physical evidence can't stand by itself. At the very least, someone has to vouch for it (and then you have to believe them).
Back to the story line (HWSNBN's tall tales, that is):
In this case, ACLU's etch-a-sketch version of the facts of the case are based entirely on alleged admission of the AG and General Heyden.
They're based on public statements. See the plaintiffs' reply brief, section II(A), the plaintiffs' exhibits, and the plaintiffs' Exhibits M and P (link unavailable), and the plaintiffs' statemenf of undisputed facts.
The Government has not agreed to any of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs and has submitted its own classified version of the facts to the judge stating that the surveillance is limited to al Qaeda and is not targeting the plaintiffs.
Irrelevant per se. If they wish to dispute the plaintiff's allegations and argue that there are sufficient facts for trial, they may do so. But it's not clear they have. Just saying that they're not wiretapping the plaintiffs is insufficient to defeat the plaintiffs' claims (and they haven't even made such a claim, AFAIK).
If the plaintiffs agree to this set of government facts, they will lose summary judgment and the case will be dismissed for lack of standing because they have conceded that the NSA is not surveilling their telephone calls.
That wasn't their claim! *sheesh* How many times will HWSNBN throw out this "red herring"? It's really starting to stink up the joint....
But FWIW, how can the plaintiffs agree to a set of "facts" that they're not even being allowed to see?
Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs did not concede the government's facts in their reply brief, therefore there are no stipulated facts in the case upon which to rule on summary judgment.
Another "red herring". There doesn't need to be a set of "stipulated facts". Covered above. HWSNBN continutes to act clueless and ignore it.
Cheers,
Arne Langsetmo -
ReplyDeleteis HWSNBN seriously a licensed attorney that does not understand the standards for summary judgment? or are you joking about the "criminal prosecutor" stuff?
nerpzilla:
ReplyDeleteis HWSNBN seriously a licensed attorney that does not understand the standards for summary judgment? or are you joking about the "criminal prosecutor" stuff?
HWSNBN (a/k/a "bart", or briefly here, "Bart DePalma") describes himself on his web page as a practising attorney (doing a service to the DUI community) in Colorado. He lists on his resume:
"Before establishing the DePalma Law Firm, LLC in 2005, Mr. DePalma served both as a criminal prosecutor and as a civil trial attorney."
But it seems that his "serv[ing]" as a "criminal prosecutor" (something he touted specifically on this blog a while back as argumentum ad verecundiam for his claims as to knowledge of warrant procedures) consisted of this:
"During law school, Mr. DePalma interned for Florida Supreme Court Justice Charles Wells and with the Office of the State Attorney as a criminal prosecutor."
A student intern in the OSA! ROFLMAO. Which is why I sometimes refer to him as a "criminal prosecutor"..... ;-)
IOW, he's a blow-hard resume-padding eedjit. I feel sorry for the drunks he plea bargains down (but not too sorry, even though everyone deserves competent counsel and the full protection of the law).
Cheers,