Saturday, October 29, 2005

Responses to Libby Defenders

If the only defenses which Lewis Libby is going to have at trial are the ones which have so far been circulated online (including in the comments section to my last post), he is in serious trouble.

The excuses (both legal and political) being made on his behalf, at least thus far, rest upon clear factual and/or legal distortions, and do not even appear to be intellectually honest. Here is the summary of (and responses to) the most common Libby defenses:

(1) Nothing Libby did with regard to the “leak” itself was illegal because Valerie Plame was not a “covert” agent.

Whether Plame was “covert” or not, the fact that she was employed by the CIA was indisputably classified, and the law prohibited Libby from doing exactly what he did – i.e., disclosing that classified information to those not authorized to receive it (the reporters).

The Indictment makes absolutely clear that: (a) Plame’s employment with the CIA was classified (see Paragraph 1(f)): “At all relevant times . . . Valerie Wilson was employed by the CIA, and her employment status was classified”); and (b) Libby disclosed this classified information to reporters. Although he was not indicted on that charge, he clearly engaged in that illegal conduct.

It is illegal to disclose classified information to individuals who are not cleared to receive it. Period. While there is a specific 1982 criminal statute which specifically criminalizes the outing of overseas covert CIA agents and which does require that the agent be covert, the general laws prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of classified information merely require that the disclosed information be classified (which Plame's CIA employment at the time indisputably was).

(2) It is now clear that Libby committed no underlying crime; his only crime was the cover-up.

Just because someone isn’t indicted for a crime doesn’t mean they didn’t commit the crime, nor does it mean that the prosecutor can't prove the crime. The absence of a specific charge in an indictment does not mean that the defendant did not commit that crime.

There are lots of reasons relating to prosecutorial discretion as to why a Prosecutor would opt not to indict someone on a particular charge even where the Prosecutor believed that crime was committed and he could prove it.

Here, there are many potential reasons why Fitzgerald may have opted not to seek an indictment on the underlying crime (all of which he hinted at or expressly stated in his Press Conference):


(a) Fitzgerald has Libby so completely nailed on these serious obstruction and perjury counts that he did not need to cloud the indictment with more difficult-to-prove, complex charges;

(b) Fitzgerald feels he lacks all of the evidence necessary to prove the requisite intent on the "leaking" charges precisely because Libby’s lying and obstruction prevented him from obtaining clear evidence in that regard;

(c) Fitzgerald has general policy concerns about the Espionage Act, the statute which arguably criminalizes the disclosure of classified information, becoming tantamount to the odious States Secret Act in England, and he opted not to bring charges under the Espinoage Act due to those policy concerns; and,

(d) Fitzgerald is hoping to induce Libby into cooperating as part of a plea bargain and intends to hold over his head the threat of additional indictments relating to the leak itself as leverage in those negotiations.

Any of these are perfectly legitimate (and hardly unusual) reasons for Fitzgerald not to have sought indictments directly arising out of the outing of Plame. In all events, the lack of such an indictment (thus far) is far from a declaration by Fitzgerlad that no crime was committed when Plame’s CIA employment was disclosed.

To use the absence of an indictment as some sort of proof that Libby was found to be innocent of wrongdoing concerning the “leak” -- or that no crime was committed when her employment was leaked -- is simply dishonest.

If anything, the Indictment implicitly alleges that Libby did commit a crime by leaking her CIA employment to reporters because, at all times, that information was “classified.”

(3) Libby had no reason to lie or cover-up because he didn’t commit an underlying crime in the first place.

When Libby was interviewed by the FBI beginning in October, 2003, and when he testified in front of the Grand Jury beginning in March, 2004, he obviously didn’t know that Fitzgerald, in October 2005, would ultimately refrain from indicting on the underlying charges. To the contrary, the foremost fear in Libby's mind at that time had to be that his disclosure of classified information to reporters would be discovered.

After all, that was the charge which prompted the investigation and led to the appointment of Fitzgerald. Libby knew that – and he also knew that he did indeed disclose to several reporters the indisputably classified information that Plame worked for the CIA. He had every reason to want to cover that up.

Strictly on a legal level, at the time he was speaking to the FBI and testifying in front of the Grand Jury, Libby had every reason to fear that what he did in disclosing Plame’s CIA employment to reporters was illegal. It is easy to understand why he would want to lie about the source of the information – if reporters already had the classified information and it was reporters who passed it on to Libby, then that would be a perfect, complete defense to the potential crime that was being investigated.

By stark contrast, if Libby told the truth about what happened – i.e., if he admitted that he obtained the classified information of Plame's employment from the CIA and from Cheney and then disseminated it to reporters – that would be a confession to actions which quite likely did, indeed, constitute a crime.

It makes perfect sense that he’d want to cover up that conduct by lying about it. He lied about it for the same simple reason all common perjurers in that situation lie: because they are petrified that if the truth were known about what they did, they will be convicted and imprisoned. And so they lie in order to prevent others from discovering what occurred.

Beyond purely legal considerations, Libby also had ample motivation to lie for political reasons. What he did was facially ugly and politically damaging. Legalities aside, he learned from the Vice President and the CIA the classified information that Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA and then disclosed that information to reporters.

The fact that he first learned from the Vice President dragged Cheney into this scandal (as a political matter, if not a legal one). Worse, in the Fall of 2003, Scott McClellan, succumbing to increasing media questioning, was forced to emphatically and expressly assure the public that Libby (among others) had no role in the disclosure of Plame’s CIA employment, independently providing motivation for Libby to avoid discovery of what he really did.

It is hardly difficult to imagine Libby -- when talking to the FBI and the Grand Jury -- wanting desperately to avoid these politically damaging revelations, especially as they pertained to his boss. He thus had ample motivation, both legal and political, to lie both about the source of his knowledge that Plame worked for the CIA as well as what he told reporters about this.

(4) This is about nothing more than Libby’s understandably getting a few dates confused well after the events occurred.

Even the people advancing this excuse can’t possibly believe it. What is important is not the date on which Libby learned of Plame’s employment with the CIA (i.e., June 4 v. June 14 v. July 10). If it were only a failure to recall dates accurately, there would almost certainly be no charges.

What matters here is the means by which Libby learned of Plame’s employment – whether it was simply by having reporters pass unconfirmed rumors to him (as he falsely claimed), or whether he learned this information from multiple high-level Government sources who confirmed it to him as fact (i.e. whether he learned it due to his access to classified government secrets).

No rational or fair person could find the suggestion credible that Libby simply forgot that he learned of Plame’s CIA employment from other government officials. This excuse could be credible if he had learned about Plame's employment during one casual or routine conversation in which it was discussed in passing. But that is not what happened – not even close.

The Joe Wilson/Valerie Plame matter was one of great importance and prominence for Libby throughout June and early July. As the Indictment documents, he was told about Plame not on one occasion, but on multiple occasions.

And he wasn’t hearing it from mid-level government bureaucrats. He heard it first from the Vice President of the United States (early June), then from a “senior CIA officer” (June 11), then from the “Under Secretary of State” (June 12), then during a discussion with a “CIA briefer” (June 14), and finally from the Counsel to the Office of Vice President (July 8).

That's four separate ocassions when Libby learned about Plame's CIA employment from high- level officials, and one ocassions when he learned it as part of a CIA briefing.

Plainly, the subject of Plame’s CIA employment was something that was being discussed in the Vice President’s Office repeatedly and systematically over the course of five (5) weeks. Libby learned this information as fact from executive and intelligence officials at the highest levels, including his boss, the Vice President.

Just as importantly, Libby not only repeatedly heard from other Bush officials about Plame’s employment, he himself repeatedly disseminated that information, including to the Administration’s Press Secretary on July 7, and, of course, to reporters on multiple occasions beginning in June.

The notion, then, that Libby simply “forgot” that he had this information confirmed as fact by multiple, classified Government sources -- and that he instead simply “mis-remembered” and mistakenly thought that he only heard it from a couple of reporters as rumors – is facially incredible, insultingly so. There was a concerted effort underway by multiple Bush officials to find out about Wilson and his wife, and Libby, being at the center of that effort, did not “forget” that it happened.

And, contrary to the excuses being made on Libby’s behalf, there was not all that much time that elapsed between the events themselves and the first lies about them told by Libby. In fact, there was very little time which elapsed.

The first allegedly false statement he gave to the FBI occurred on October 14 (see COUNT THREE, Paragraph 2) – a mere three to four months after the relevant events occurred. When one notes additionally that there was ongoing and quite public uproar over the Plame disclosures during that time period (which is what prompted the investigation in the first place), it is simply absurd to assert that the matter of Plame’s CIA employment was some inconsequential little detail which, particularly during that time period, could simply have slipped Libby’s mind.

What happened here appears quite clear. Libby knew he had obtained the information about Plame’s CIA employment from high-level Bush officials and intelligence officers and that, as a result, it would certainly be slimy, and quite possibly illegal, for him to have disclosed this classified information to reporters. As a result, he did not want it known (understandably so) that he did that, and so he lied to the FBI (and then the Grand Jury) by claiming that he learned of Plame’s CIA employment from reporters, and not from classified Government sources.

The real mystery is why so many people seem to be pretending that Libby’s motives to lie are non-existent or perplexing. In disclosing to reporters the classified information of Plame's CIA employment, what Libby did was wrong and almost certainly illegal. He lied about it because he did not want it known that he did it. What is confusing about that?

7 comments:

  1. Anonymous11:01 AM

    I'm not "defending" Libby but merely pointing to his defenses. I think Libby had plenty of reasons to lie, or at least be cute, because at the time he didn't know where the investigation into the underlying crime would lead.

    But from what I've seen so far, Fitzgerald didn't catch Libby in an unequivocal mistatement of fact to investigators or the grand jury, specifically about when and where Libby first learned of Plame's CIA identity, the most provable fact in Fitzgeral's arsenal against Libby.

    If Fitzgerald brings a case based on Libby lying about when he first learned of Plame's CIA identity, the looming question at trail might be why didn't investgators just ask Libby that question directly. Instead, the prosecution appears to have teased this "perjury" from Libby's testimony about conversations he had with reporters, occasions when it was perfectly appropriate for Libby to be coy about his knowledge about Plame's CIA identity. Again, see Libby's statements on page 18 of idictment and judge for yourself.

    Given a fair jury in a criminal case, however, I think if both sides appear they were being too cute, rather than direct in the questions asked, the answers given and the charges made, Libby walks.

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  2. Anonymous1:56 PM

    I didn't apologize for Libby (and offering up criticisms in those terms doesn't speak well for you). Rather than choosing to believe that no one can possibly believe Libby got dates and conversations mixed up, lets try to do this again and see if you can consider this seriously:

    Libby was in the middle of a war effort.

    He was talking to dozens of reporters a day, often times for only minutes at a time - while holding staff meetings, briefings, etc. While the Wilson-affair was a top agenda item, it wasn't the only agenda item.

    It is quite possible, and certainly reasonable, that during the course of those 4 or 5 days he had several conversations with Russert. Could it be Russert said something that surprised him, related to the war but not necessarily about Plame?

    It's possible. Is it enough to raise reasonable doubt? Don't know. Depends on the facts surrounding the case.

    Having sat on a Grand Jury I've seen for myself cases that seemed like slam-dunks in the GJ room fall apart when the Defense gets a chance to respond... you feel like an idiot for having indicted in the first place.

    But we can't be bothered with hearing both sides before making unequivocal statements of guilt, can we?

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  3. Here's the key selection of text from the indictment. It's Libby's testimony about his conversation with Russert.

    "[A]t that point in time I did not recall that I had ever known, and I thought this is something that he was telling me that I was first learning."

    That is a clear, unambiguous claim that he first learned the information about Joe Wilson's wife from a reporter.

    And it is willfully false, a lie, and a crime.

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  4. Hey Ed - How about that last quote from GeekEsq? Is that clear enough?

    I will concede this much: it is odd that there is no wholly unambiguous, super-clean exchange cited in the Indictment along these lines:

    Q. When was the first occasion when someone indicated to you that Valerie Wilson -- whether referred to that way, as Valerie Plame or as "Wilson's wife" -- worked for the CIA?

    A. When I spoke with Mr. Russert on July 10.


    . . . or . . .

    Q. Is it true that when Mr. Russert told you during your July 10 telephone conversation that Wilson's wife worked for the CIA, you had never heard that from any other source previously?

    A. That is correct.


    It is true that one would expect to find an exchange along those lines, and the Indictment doesn't cite one in this format.

    But if you listened to Fitzgerald at his Press Conference, it is abundantly clear that the crux of this Indictment is that Libby repeatedly claimed (falsely) that his chat with Russert was when he heard it for the first time, and that as of the time he talked to Miller and Cooper, he had only heard it as rumor from other reporters.

    I find it impossible to believe - not difficult, but impossible - that Fitzgerald didn't ask clearly on at least one occasion when it was that Libby heard this for the first time. And I have no doubt that Libby testified clearly that it was when he talked to Russert.

    There are enough excerpts in the Indictment which, taken together, provide certainty that this is what Libby was claiming. And it is just inconceivable that Fitzgerald would bring charges based upon Libby's perjurious claims as to when he first learned about Plame unless there are clear places in the testimonial record where Libby said that he learned it first when he spoke with Russert.

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  5. Anonymous1:42 PM

    From one attorney to another, excellent work Glenn.

    It is simply amazing the lengths to which people will go to deny what is so plain from the indictment.

    Anonymous said: “He was talking to dozens of reporters a day, often times for only minutes at a time - while holding staff meetings, briefings, etc.”

    What has been reported about Scooter's style in general has made it clear that in fact this is not his MO at all. Maybe Rove, but not Scooter. Multiple writers and publications have reported he rarely acts as a source or mixes it up with reporters, and when he does he prefers long conversations. Heck, all you need to look at is his dealings with Miller in this matter. Going from memory wasn’t one a breakfast with her and another a face to face meeting at OEB?

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  6. Anonymous1:38 AM

    While I have never defended a perjury case, I am a big fan of well-drafted complaints.

    It says much for Fitzgerald’s skill that intelligent people could read the indictment and listen to his comments and get the impression that Libby blatantly lied about easily confirmable facts. Many commentators are taking that position. Kristoff's column is based on that assumption.

    Heck, I like to write my complaints as close to the line as possible. It is, after all, the first impression that anyone will get of your case.

    The complaint charges Libby not with perjury or false statements for saying to the FBI/grand jury that he learned of Plame from Russert, but for saying to the FBI/GRAND JURY that, when he spoke to Russert, he did not remember that “at the time of his conversation with Russert” he already knew of Plame.

    Fitzgerald said in his press conference and press release that Libby lied with respect to when and where he learned of Plame. This is disingenuous and misleading insofar as even Fitzgerald quotes Libby telling the FBI in his first interview (Par 26) that he learned from about Plame from Cheney but did not remember he knew it when talking to reporters.

    When interviewed by the FBI and again in front of the grand jury, Libby explained that he had first heard of Plame through gov’t sources. Quotes in the indictment.

    But,
    He told reporters that he heard it from other reporters. He told the FBI and the GRAND JURY that he was surprised when reporters told him that Plame was involved because he had forgotten that he had initially learned from gov’t sources. Fitzgerald can easily show that he should not have been surprised, as he had been working on the issue for over a month at the time of the conversations. Fitzgerald’s indictment spends a lot of time proving that Libby knew something that he disclosed he knew whenever he was questioned.

    That seems like a slam-dunk, except that, as he did not lie about what he knew, where he learned it, or when he knew it, his (easily provable) lie about his state of mind seems, perhaps ... immaterial?

    With regard to the substantive misstatements about the content of his conversations with reporters, materiality is not the issue.

    However,
    (insert mandatory “I have never defended a perjury charge")
    Isn’t it a bit difficult to prove a he-said/(s)he said case when the accusers refuse to answer questions? For example, Cooper, Russert, and Miller famously refused to answer questions about who else, if anyone, told them anything about the case. That doesn’t affect their credibility for probable cause, but it certainly has an impact on Libby’s ability to confront his accuser, and lends some (perhaps) reasonable doubt.

    I think I may have answered my own question a bit here, though. Fitzgerald can easily prove that Libby should have, and probably did, remember about Plame at the time he spoke to Russert. It makes it more plausible that Libby would misrepresent other, more important portions of the conversation if he would misrepresent such a minor point.

    IIRC, there may be a Sixth Amendment/Fed Rules of Evidence issue with Fitzgerald attempting to introduce testimony by a party who will testify to only part of the relevant facts. Here, where Cooper would say “he said nothing to me about other reporters talking about Plame” but then presumably refuse to answer the logical defense question “did you discuss this with other reporters prior to talking to Libby?”, Libby’s confrontation right may be impacted. Any FRE aficionados?
    Of course, then Cooper would face contempt (again?).

    Remember the meme (seems that it was only last week...) that Keller, Dowd, et. al. were helping Libby by dinging Ms. “Miss Run Amok” Miller’s credibility? Miller was so important to his investigation that she had to go to jail lest her testimony be lost. Yet, after being trashed for two weeks, she barely appears in an indictment that relies on reporters' credibility for conviction.

    Boiled down to elements in contention, Fitzgerald must show that (1) Miller is right and Libby is lying (her notes are only somewhat helpful here, as her own editors say they are not up to snuff and she makes up conversations and allegations out of whole cloth (Abramson and Calame); (2) Cooper is right and Libby is lying (We haven’t seen Cooper’s notes, but we know that he would go to jail rather than answer questions about people other than Rove or Libby); (3) Russert is right and Libby is lying (Remember, Russert says he only testified to what he told Libby). If Fitzgerald cannot prove at least two of those three, the obstruction of justice count probably falls. The argument is about a few words in a conversation both parties admit two years before the reporters were questioned under oath, and, for all that Fitzgerald argues that there is a common motive, the individual lies are different for each reporter, so proving one doesn’t prove the next.
    Finally, (4) Libby lied about the emotions he felt while talking to the reporters, because, at the time he talked to the reporters, he remembered something he says now he had forgotten then.

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  7. Anonymous6:28 AM

    Geek,esq. and Glen:

    Again, I never denied that Libby may have lied to investigators about how and when he first learned of Plame's CIA identity, nor have I discounted the possibility that Fitzgerald may have more evidence hidden in his back pocket with which to prove it. I just think what the prosecutor has shown thus far in his indictment is weak on its face.

    Look at the entirety of the sentence from Libby's testimony quoted in the indictment that Geek,esq selectively excerpts: "And I said, no, I don't know that intentionally because I didn't want him [Russert] to take anything I was saying as in any way confirming what he said, because at that point in time I did not recall that I had ever known, and I thought this is something that he was telling me that I was first learning."

    Next sentence: "And so I said, no, I don't know that because I want to be very careful not to confirm it for him, so that he didn't take my statement as confirmation for him."

    In context, it seems very reasonable for the defense to argue that when Libby elaborated "because at that point in time I did not recall," this dependent clause related back to the prior clause of the very same sentence(omitted by Geek,esq) wherein Libby recounted "I said, no, I don't know that... intentionally" after Russert asked him whether Wilson's wife works at the CIA.

    In other words, in describing his answers to Russert's questions, Libby can claim that he "intentionally" answered "I don't know that... because at that point in time [in my conversations with reporters] I did not recall... because I want[ed] to be careful not to confirm it" when I was asked whether Wilson's wife worked at the CIA.

    As a defense, I think this can fit rather well into testimony Libby is likely to elicit from people who handle classified information. I understand they often describe themselves as method actors who must create two (or more) compartmentalized realities in their minds and in their dealings with people who do and do not have clearance. Add to this the practical difficulty an official has actually pulling off a two-way "can't confirm or deny" statement, unless you feign ignorance or the inability to recall prior knowledge, especially when the official doesn't know the strength of the reporter's sources.

    Without more, I still think the prosecutor's failure to give Libby the opportunity to answer a direct question about how and when he first learned of Plame's CIA identity is likely to prove fatal to a conviction on this count.

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